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Redefining the Second Amendment:
The Antebellum Right to Keep and Bear
Arms and Its Present Legacy
BY HAYDN J. RICHARDS, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
"In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights."--James Madison1
A quest to realize notions of freedom and liberty clearly served as the
impetus for the American Revolution. Although scholars such as
John Locke cultivated ideas of freedom and the natural rights of man,'
liberty would not become a tangible construct until after the United States
emerged victorious from the Revolution. Impassioned cries made by great
orators demonstrated the founding fathers' idealistic commitment to liberty
and freedom. Yet, although the constructs of liberty and the natural rights
J.D. 2002 (with Honors), The George Washington University School of Law;
B.A. 1999 (in History with Honors), The College of William and Mary.
The author wishes to thank Professor Robert J. Cottrol, Harold Paul Green
Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University School of Law, for
his assistance with this Article. Additionally, the author wishes to thank John
Bomancin, who provided insight that fostered the author's desire to research the
right to keep and bear arms.
The author is a law clerk to the Honorable Diane Gilbert Sypolt of the United
States Court of Federal Claims. This Article was written before the clerkship
began, and the views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Judge Sypolt or the United States Court of Federal
Claims.
'James Madison, Property, I NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, at 174, reprinted
in 4 THE JAMES MADISON LETTERS 478 (1884).
2 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
' Clearly the most infamous cry for liberty belongs to Patrick Henry, who
stated, "I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty or
give me death!" Speech by Patrick Henry before the Virginia House of Delegates,
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of man are fixed realities for the contemporary American populace, they
formerly were intangibles that were sculpted into their present state by the
founding fathers.
In order to appreciate the framework of the Constitution and its Bill of
Rights, it is essential to understand what our nation's founding fathers
suffered and what they sought to gain through revolution. The founding
fathers lived in an era when Great Britain increasingly taxed imports and
exports.4 Following the Seven Years' War, Great Britain needed a revenue
source to provide for the standing army that it chose to maintain in the
American colonies.5 Notwithstanding their status as British citizens, men
in the colonies lacked representation in Parliament.6 Although increased
Richmond, Virginia (Mar. 23, 1775), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 270 (16th ed. 1992).
4 See, e.g., -The Sugar Act, 1764, 9 Geo. 3; The Stamp Act, 1765, 10 Geo. 3;
The Townshend Act, 1767, 8 Geo. 3; The Tea Act, 1773, 12 Geo. 3.
5 During the eighteenth century, the entire continent of Europe, including Great
Britain, seemed to be at war. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REv. 167,
215-16 (1996). The Seven Years' War was fought between Great Britain and
France both in Europe and North America. The war is more readily known as the
French and Indian War in the United States. For additional information regarding
taxation following the Seven Years' War, see David C. Williams, Civic Republi-
canism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
551, 573 (1991).
6 Several of the grievances highlighted in the Declaration of Independence
discuss the injustices of the King in denying the colonists fair representation.
Specifically, the Declaration of Independence notes that:
[The king] has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of
large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formida-
ble to tyrants only.
... He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing
with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.
... For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves
invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5, 7, 24 (U.S. 1776).
• In a letter written before the Declaration of Independence, a group of colonial
figures, highlighted by John Hancock, complain that "[t]axes equally detrimental
to the Commercial interests of the Parent country and the colonies, are imposed
upon the People, without their Consent." Letter from John Hancock et al., as
"Selectmen of Boston," to "Selectmen of Petersham" (Sept. 14, 1768), at The
Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, http://www.gliah.uh.edu/documents/
documents_.p2.cfm?doc=281 (last modified Oct. 25, 2002).
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taxes and limited representation often were adequate grounds of protest,
other British atrocities served, to a much greater extent, to inflame and
invigorate the passions of the American revolutionaries.
As discord rose due to the visible presence of the British, the Crown
continually increased the size of its forces in the colonies and permitted
British soldiers to seize American homes so that soldiers might quarter
themselves at their leisure.7 British soldiers frequently raided community
armories, taking public stores of firearms and gunpowder.' Moreover, the
British limited the rights of individuals to carry their own weapons.9 The
colonists were left without a means to protect themselves; the British had
taken their arms and invaded the sanctity of their homes. Americans were
treated as second-class British citizens; they were subject to the whims of
British commanders, seemingly prisoners upon their own land. After
suffering under the rule of the British, the founders would never permit
their new government to commit like offenses. To protect the populace, the
founding fathers drafted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which
guarantee rights and privileges for all Americans.
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: "A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'" In
recent years, academics have struggled to parse the words of the amend-
7See, e.g., The Quartering Act, 1765, 10 Geo. 3; The Quartering Act, 1774, 12
Geo. 3.
'For example, on April 21, 1775, one week following the battles of Lexington
and Concord, British soldiers from the H.M.S. Magdalen secretly removed most
of the gunpowder from the armory in Williamsburg, Virginia, which was the capital
of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, hoped that
his action would prevent open rebellion in Virginia. Instead, his actions inflamed
Virginia revolutionaries, culminating twelve days later with Patrick Henry leading
over 150 men to demand the return of the gunpowder. Rhys Isaac, Dramatizing the
Ideology of Revolution: Popular Mobilization in Virginia, 1774 to 1776, 33 WM.
& MARY Q. 357, 379-81 (1976). For a more thorough description of the events in
Williamsburg, see Williamsburg-The Old Colonial Capital, 16 WM. & MARY Q.
1, 43-47 (1907). Additionally, the British army made several attempts, both
successful and unsuccessful, to raid arsenals storing Weapons and gunpowder in
the Boston area. In fact, the battles at Lexington and Concord were sparked by an
intended raid on the storehouse at Concord. See David T. Hardy, The Second
Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, 25
(1987).
9 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213, 216 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton
University Press 1950).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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ment in their quest to discern its meaning." In so doing, academics have
divided into, two predominant schools of thought: (1) adherents to the
collective rights theory," and (2) adherents to the "individual rights"
theory. 3
"Numerous articles regarding the Second Amendment and the right to bear
arms have been written during the twentieth century. See, e.g., Lucilius A. Emery,
The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARV. L. REV. 473 (1915);
Daniel J. McKenna, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12 MARQ. L. REV. 138
(1928). However, the recent heightening of awareness of the right to bear arms
began with historians during the 1970s. See, e.g., Lawrence Delbert Cress, Radical
Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological Roots of the American
Revolutionary Militia, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 43 (1979); Lawrence Delbert Cress,
Republican Liberty and National Security: American Military Policy as an
Ideological Problem, 1783 to 1789, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 73 (1981); Robert E.
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the SecondAmendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599
(1982); Robert E. Shalhope & Lawrence Delbert Cress, The Second Amendment
and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587 (1984). Following
this analysis by historians, legal scholars followed suit in their analysis of that
right. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amend-
ment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991)
[hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment]; Keith A. Ehrman &
Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing SecondAmendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); William Van Alstyne,
The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236
(1994).
2 Collective Rights scholars have nicknamed the individual rights approach the
"revisionist theory." In doing so, these scholars attempt to cement their approach
as the more acceptable theory. See, e.g., David Yassky, The Second Amendment:
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588 (2000).
However, for the vast majority of American history, the popular belief was that the
Second Amendment conveyed an individual right to keep and bear arms. Scholars
Stephen Halbrook and David Kopel go as far to say that "[a]ll legal scholarship
dating from the creation of the Second Amendment and extending through the first
decades of the twentieth century considered the Second Amendment to guarantee
an individual right." Stephen P. Halbrook & David B. Kopel, Tench Coxe and the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 1787-1823, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 347, 352
(1999) (emphasis added). Only recently have academics questioned this long-
standing belief. Thus, it is the collective rights theory that in fact holds the position
as a "revisionist approach."
13 The Individual Rights approach is also known as the "Standard Model" of the
Second Amendment in that it guarantees the right of individual Americans to own
and carry firearms. Halbrook & Kopel, supra note 12, at 351.
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The collective rights or "states' rights" theory surmises that the
amendment creates only a "collective right" to bear arms and hence does
not grant individuals the right to keep and bear arms.14 Collective rights
theorists contend that people only have the right to bear arms when
protecting the nation in their capacity as militiamen. 5 Thus they place the
weight of their analysis upon the importance of the amendment's initial
clause, its militia clause.'
6
Unlike collective rights theorists, adherents to the individual rights
theory argue that the Second Amendment grants each individual the right
to keep and bear arms without governmental interference. 7 Although there
"'Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The SecondAmendment and States'
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1742-43 (1995).
Isld.
16 A wide variety of scholars adhere to the collective rights theory. See, e.g.,
DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA (1995); Carl T. Bogus, The
Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 309 (1998);
Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson 's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661
(1989); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 5; Paul Finkelman, "A Well
Regulated Militia": The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 195 (2000); H. Ober Hess, Second Amendment-The Right to Bear
Arms, 71 PA. B.A. Q. 82 (2000); Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV.
OF BOOKS, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62-73; Yassky, supra note 12, at 588.
Another scholar, David C. Williams, seems to take more of a hybrid approach
to the collective rights and individual rights movements. In one article, he argues
that the "well regulated Militia" protects the security of the free State only so long
as the vast majority of the population is armed. Since this is no longer true,
Williams feels that the right is outdated and thus, without meaning. See, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 5, at 554-55. In another article, he proposes that judges
interpreting the amendment should consider both of its clauses together, as a
unitary whole. In doing so, judges would not give primacy to any particular clause.
David C. Williams, The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 829
(1998).
7 Recently, increasing numbers of scholars advocate an individual rights theory
of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 46-63, 257-68 (1998); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
(1984); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133-49 (1999); Robert
J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to be Applied to the White
Population ": Firearms Regulation andRacial Disparity--The Redeemed South's
Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995)
[hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, Never Intended to be Applied]; Cottrol &
2002-2003]
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are several approaches that attempt to justify the individualist theory, many
scholars argue that the amendment conveys a right of armed resistance
against the government when the government supersedes the bounds of its
authority. 18 In contrast to collective rights theorists, individual rights
scholars place emphasis upon the latter portion of the amendment.
As with many constitutional issues, contemporary political beliefs
greatly influence these dominant schools ofthought. While members of gun
advocacy groups promote the individualist theory and gun control groups
promote the collective rights theory, academics have increasingly joined the
political fray. In focusing upon their respective political agendas,1 9
Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11; Stephen P. Halbrook,
Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-Revolutionary
Origins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91 (1989); Don B.
Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983); David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner,
The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the Second Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 737 (1995); Levinson, supra note 11; Roger I. Roots, The
Approaching Death of the Collective Right Theory of the Second Amendment, 39
DUQ. L. REV. 71 (2000); Van Alstyne, supra note 11; Eugene Volokh, The
Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998).
Moreover, it should be noted that in the latest version of his constitutional law
treatise, Professor Laurence H. Tribe has an extensive discussion of the Second
Amendment in which he suggests that the Second Amendment may convey an
individual right to bear arms. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 2000).
" This variation of the revisionist approach is frequently termed the "Insurrec-
tionist Rights" theory. For examples of insurrectionist theory argument, see, e.g.,
JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).
19 For example, Dennis A. Henigan, a collective rights scholar wrote his article,
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 58 n.aa, while acting as the Director of the
Legal Action Project at the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence in Washington,
D.C. The Center to Prevent Handgun Violence is an organization devoted to
lobbying for gun control legislation. See Brady Campaign and the Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence, at http://www.bradycampaign.org/about/index.asp (last
visited Oct. 29,2002). Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., an individual rights scholar, wrote
his article, The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, while acting as an
Assistant General Counsel for the National Rifle Association of America. See
Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How.
L.J. 589, 597 n.al (1991). The National Rifle Association is a civil rights
organization that lobbies to limit gun control legislation and to protect the right to
keep and bear arms. See NRA Institute for Legislative Action, at http://www.
nraila.org/about.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2002). I do not intend to suggest that all
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members of both the collective rights and individual rights groups have
misconstrued and inaccurately portrayed the original intent and actual
meaning of the Second Amendment.
This Article sets forth a new, apolitical Second Amendment analysis.
In many instances, it relies on traditional literature that has been cited as
support by each school of thought. However, this Article takes an
innovative approach to Second Amendment analysis, treading a different
path than previous scholarship. Instead of focusing entirely upon traditional
sources, this Article also highlights the views of dissenting members of the
American populace. History has demonstrated that dissenters are frequently
most capable in their ability to convey the true intent of the majority, along
with the concerns of the minority. By considering both traditional and non-
traditional sources, this Article sets forth a new Second Amendment
analysis that arrives at the original intent of the framers. Part I evaluates the
original intent of the framers by examining traditional sources 20 Part II sets
forth the views of William Manning, a common man who crafted an
extraordinary manuscript following the drafting of the Constitution, are set
forth.2' Part I attacks the notion that the framers exclusively intended the
Second Amendment to be a measure serving states and citizen militias.22
Part IV examines the amendment in the context of slavery and the South.23
Lastly, Part V' analyzes the Fourteenth Amendment, the incorporation
debate, and its bearing on the Second Amendment.24
I. THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE FRAMERS:
AMENDMENT DRAFTS AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITIA
A. Drafts of the Second Amendment
The drafting of the Bill of Rights was a measure in direct response to
the abuses suffered by the colonists while under British rule. Adhering to
the views of philosopher John Locke, Americans believed that men
inherited natural rights that could not be altered or usurped by the
Second Amendment scholarship suffers from inherent political bias. However, I do
wish to highlight that some scholarship in this area does have the appearance of
bias.20 See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 84-142 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text.
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monarchy. For example, in his commentary on the workings of government,
Dissertations on the First Principles of Government, Thomas Paine
noted:
A declaration of rights is not a creation of them, nor a donation of them.
It is a manifest of the principle by which they exist, followed by a detail
of what the rights are; for every civil right has a natural right for its
foundation... [a]s, therefore, it is impossible to discover any origin of
rights otherwise than in the origin of man, it consequently follows, that
rights appertain to man in right of his existence only, and must therefore
be equal to every man.
25
The Bill of Rights was not drafted to create new rights; instead, the
founding fathers explicitly set forth natural rights that were previously
understood as inalienable.26 These natural rights were unassailable because
it was understood that they were a birthright of all men. Phrased differently,
all men possessed the same, and equal, natural rights.
Following the adoption of the Constitution, James Madison proposed
the Bill of Rights as a set of amendments to the Constitution to appease
those who were unhappy with the document. Specifically drafted to protect
the personal freedoms of the populace, Madison proposed that, "[t]he right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render
military service in person., 27 This initial draft reflects Madison's true
intent; its initial clause conveys the message that "the people" should have
the right to keep and bear arms and that right shall not be infringed. The
proposed amendment's initial clause conveys a broad statement of purpose
to the reader. Rather than limiting the freedom to keep and bear arms to the
militia, the focus of the amendment lies in the ability of "the people" to
keep and bear arms.
25 THOMAS PAINE, Dissertation on the First Principles of Government, in LIFE
AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 267 (Daniel Edwin Wheeler ed., 1908).
26 Id. Professor Roger Roots notes that "[fjederalist defenders of the pre-
amendment constitution offered the natural right to bear arms as the reason that no
bill of rights was needed." Roots, supra note 17, at 87. Blackstone believed
governmental authorizations of the right to have arms were "public allowance[s]
under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and selfpreservation, when
the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of
oppression." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 107 (Morrison ed., 2001).
27 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Thomas Lloyd ed., 1789).
[VOL. 91
REDEFINING THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The phrase, "the people," is a curious phrase used in a limited fashion
throughout the Constitution.2" When used, it refers to those members of the
American populace who "'ordain[ed] and establish[ed]' the Constitu-
tion;"29 the phrase "the people" alludes to citizens who possessed all the
rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution." In using this phraseol-
ogy in the Second Amendment, Madison intended to convey this right to
"the people," which seems to include all men who had the right to vote.
3'
However, considerable disagreement exists over whether Madison intended
the phrase to convey a selective right to keep and bear arms.32 Thus, it
28 Akhil Reed Amar notes that the phrase is set forth in the Preamble of the
Constitution as the body that, "in conventions had 'ordain[ed] and establish[ed]'
the Constitution." AMAR, supra note 17, at 49. Amar notes that "the words 'the
People' appear[ ] only once in the original Constitution," discussing the voting
populace that would select members of the House of Representatives. Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 48-49, 258.
3" In drafting the Constitution, the founding fathers sought to ensure that an
educated elite would govern the nation in the best interests of the common man.
Historian Gordon Wood notes that "[t]he revolutionaries' stress on the circulation
of talent and on the ability of common people to elect those who had integrity and
merit presumed a certain moral capacity in the populace as a whole." GORDON S.
WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 234 (1992) (emphasis
added). In many instances, only white men who owned property enjoyed the
privilege of suffrage. It should be noted that by 1825, three states, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Louisiana, still lacked universal white manhood suffrage. Id. at 294.
Consequently, although Madison drafted the amendment with the intent of
conveying its rights to common men, he, like other founders, hoped that the
common men would elect educated elites who would, in turn, safeguard the rights
of the common man. Id. at 234. Madison even admitted that common men needed
sufficient "virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom." Id. Without
doing so, Madison believed "no form of government, can render us secure." Id. at
235. Other evidence that the founding fathers hoped the educated would govern
society is manifest in the leadership of Pennsylvania attempting to create a system
in which representatives would be elected in "at-large" fashion, rather than in
specific districts. Federalists from Philadelphia simply concluded that there were
too few men who had the abilities to govern outside of that city. Id. at 260.
32 For example, the First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. In drafting this amendment, did Madison and the framers
intend to convey the freedom of speech and to protect all individuals from
Congressional interaction with religion, while only selectively allowing "the
2002-2003)
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should be understood that in conveying the right to keep and bear arms to
"the people," Madison and the framers, at a bare minimum, conveyed this
right to those white men who were able to vote.
In Madison's initial draft of the Second Amendment, he set forth three
specific concepts: (1) the amendment ensured that the populace had a civil
right to keep and bear arms and that right could not be infringed by the
government; (2) he hoped to ease the fears of Anti-Federalists33 by
promoting the militia's role as the primary unit of protection for the United
States; and (3) he sought to exempt "religiously scrupulous" citizens from
militia service if their religious views interfered with such participation.34
people," those individuals who could vote, to peaceably assemble? If this were the
case, presumably, white men would be entitled to peaceably assemble, while white
women would not be entitled to that right. However, the phrase "the people" does
not exclusively apply only to those white men who could vote. Instead, that phrase
has two essential functions: first, it outlines a "core" set of individuals, generally
composed of white men who could vote, and second, it generally applies to "the
people" as a unitary whole. AMAR, supra note 17, at 48-49. Thus, it is possible to
interpret the phrase "the people" as applying to "First-Class Citizens," such as
white males, or all individuals, including white males that did not own property,
white women, and freedmen. Consequently, the right to peaceably assemble applies
to the population as a unitary whole. AMAR, supra note 17, at 26-27, 48-49.
" The Anti-Federalists were passionate advocates against a strong federal
government during the Constitutional Convention. They attempted to raise any
avenue of argument to eliminate the possibility of ratification. Bogus, supra note
16, at 327. Anti-Federalists such as Patrick Henry initially hoped to foster
sentiment against ratification by citing an absence of a bill of rights in the proposed
American Constitution. After defeats in state legislatures, however, they turned
their attention to proposing amendments to the document, hoping that their efforts
would fundamentally alter the dynamic between federal and state power in the new
structure of government. Finkelman, supra note 16, at 197-98.
Historian Gordon Wood believes that there were two types of Anti-Federalists;
each type of Anti-Federalist had a strong fear of centralized power in government.
However, Anti-Federalists such as George Mason or Richard Henry Lee had no
desire to "undermine the traditional order of society." WOOD, supra note 3 1, at
258. Such Anti-Federalists tended to be from the southern states. Wood identifies
another breed of Anti-Federalist, however, who had a "desire to challenge both
aristocratic leadership and the social order." Id.
' There is evidence that the members who drew up the Second Amendment
understood that each of the three clauses within the initial proposal stood on their
own with independent strength. Specifically, in debate, Mr. Stone "[i]nquired
what the words 'religiously scrupulous' had reference to: was it of bearing arms?
If it was, it ought so to be expressed." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779 (Thomas Lloyd
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In subsequent drafts, however, the religious exemption from militia service
was abandoned because drafters considered it unnecessary and feared that
the religious exemption might cripple the functionality of the militia.35
Without the latter clause providing a religious exemption, the drafters were
left with two clauses that were similar in concern but unrelated in fact. The
Second Amendment as originally drafted by Madison would no longer
convey an accurate meaning if written in its initial form.36 Curiously,
however, when those phrases were reversed,37 they formed a dichotomy in
which neither clause predominates. In this way, the intent of the founders
remained clear and the construction of the text did not need alteration. By
simply reversing the clauses, the drafters preserved the textual construction
of the amendment.3" In doing so, they appeased outspoken critics and
limited the development of different avenues of complaint regarding the
Bill of Rights and its guarantees.
ed., 1789). Without such a clarification, it was possible that the independent right
to have a weapon would not be conveyed to those who were religiously scrupu-
lous. Further discussion was not necessary upon the dissolution of the tertiary
clause.
35 Mr. Benson, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 779-80 (Thomas Lloyd ed., 1789); Mr.
Scott, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 796 (Thomas Lloyd ed., 1789). Additionally, Mr. Scott
believed this religious clause would leadto an inability to depend on the militia. He
noted "[t]his will lead to the violation of another article in the constitution, which
secures to the people the right of keeping arms, as in this case you must have
recourse to a standing army." THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 190 (Neil H. Cogan
ed., 1997) (quoting Mr. Scott, Gazette of the United States, at 250 (Aug. 22,
1789)).
36 If the proposed Amendment remained unchanged, it would have read: "The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country."
37 By reversing the phrases, the Amendment reads: "A well armed, and well
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
38 Congressional debate regarding the proposed Second Amendment is extremely
limited. In proposing the Bill of Rights, Madison sought to assuage the fears of the
Anti-Federalists, who generally considered the Constitution as a document that
created an undesirably strong federal government. If the amendment underwent
dramatic alteration of its text, debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists
might easily have intensified. Consequently, the drafters tended to reject major
alterations to the text and structure of Madison's proposed amendment. For a
compilation and analysis of Congressional debate surrounding the Bill of Rights,
along with discussion of State Conventions, please see THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 35.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH OF A COMMON MAN
39
During and immediately following the drafting of the United States
Constitution, American patriots felt compelled to espouse their opinions
regarding democracy, liberty, and federalism. One such patriot, William
Manning, was a New England farmer and laborer.4" He was a "self-
educated citizen-soldier[ ]" who joined the Continental Army in 1775 and
"fought at the... battle of Concord."'' As a Democrat, Manning hoped to
extend the influence and duties of government to all free men, rather than
rely on the abilities of the landed and educated elite to guard the rights and
liberties of the working classes.42 Thus, Manning frequently criticized
Federalist policies that repressed and restricted laborers. 3 In advocating a
new role for the working classes, Manning took a somewhat Jeffersonian
tone in his writings.44
William Manning's chief manuscript, The Key ofLiberty, relied on his
notion that there were two broad groups in society, "the Few and the
Many," that fueled the mechanism of government.45 "The Few," including
merchants, landed gentry, and professionals, were those individuals who
39 In the context of this law review Article, the reader may inquire regarding the
relevance of William Manning. William Manning's manuscript, The Key ofLiberty,
provides insight into American society immediately following the adoption of the
Constitution, and affords a unique glimpse into "the inarticulate classes." See
generally WILLIAM MANNING, THE KEY OF LIBERTY (Michael Merrill & Sean
Wilentz eds., 1993). Manning's writings, with due attention to The Key of Liberty,
hold a critical position in American history and historiography. Manuscripts rarely
discuss the sentiments of the common man during the early formation of the United
States. Yet, Manning's writings hold a critical place in that not only does he
discuss these beliefs, but he was an actual representative of the laboring class. Id.
The writings of William Manning and their value are respected to such a degree
that historian Nathan 0. Hatch noted that the manuscripts are "the rarest kind of
historical evidence, a window on the mind of a man who would generally be
considered among 'the inarticulate."' NATHAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION
OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY 26 (1989).
' MANNING, supra note 39, at 3.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 58-59. Manning clearly saw the vital role that knowledge played in
protecting liberty. In the opening paragraphs of his manuscript, he notes,
"[l]earning and knowledge is essential to the preservation of liberty; and unless we
have more of it among us, we cannot support our liberties long." Id. at 125.
43 Id. at 59.
"Id.
451 Id. at4.
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maintained professions that relied on the labor of others.46 "The Many,"
including artisans, farmers, and laborers, were those individuals who
labored so that the populace might subsist.47 Manning sought a more
egalitarian nation in which all laboring men were equal and "the Few"
would no longer be able to thrive off "the Many."4 Further, "Manning
totally rejected the notion that the Few were uniquely fit to govern."49 He
sought a truly democratic society in which all free men acted in a self-
governing capacity."0 To achieve this goal, he proposed the establishment
of the "Laboring Society," a nationwide political group that would permit
"all the free male persons" above the age of twenty-one who "labor for a
living in the United States" to join."'
In his manuscript, Manning emphatically declared that standing armies,
and their inherent ability to contribute to needless wars, are a specific
means for "the Few" to override the interests of "the Many."52 Manning
stated that defense is absolutely necessary to maintain a free nation;
however, he concluded, "the best and only safe defense of a free govern-
ment is by a well-regulated and disciplined militia. 53 Manning feared "the
Few" would entrench the standing army within the fabric of society by
"making [the militia] as costly as possible," rather than establishing a
militia system "in the cheapest and easiest manner possible. 54 Further,
Manning noted that the standing army was a device used by "the Few [to]
destroy free governments. . . ."" and maintain social control.56 A standing
army was a constant presence, similar to a police force, that would ensure
that the populace would not revolt against the elite.57
4BId. at 135-38.
47Id.
4' See id. at 70.
"9Id. at5.
5 0 Id.
" Id. at 67-68. In doing so, Manning opened the Labouring Society up to all
free men, including "free blacks" and "propertyless whites." Id. at 68.
2Id. at 142.
53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 The Declaration of Independence takes care to document the tyranny of
standing armies. In citing their grievances against the king, the founding fathers
note "[the King] is, at this Time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries
to compleat the works of Death, Desolation, and Tyranny, already begun with
circumstances of Cruelty and Perfidy, scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous
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Manning believed that standing armies should not be forcibly instituted
upon the middling classes. He believed that the elite instigated "needless
wars," or "raise[d] ... insurrection[s] or foreign war[s] only [as a] pretext
to raise and keep a standing army."58 Thus, Manning concluded that outside
action was required to shift society from its reliance upon militia as its
primary means of defense against the ubiquitous standing army. 9 This
outside event would harness the loyalty of the middling classes and blindly
focus their civic pride on the establishment of a standing army to thwart
any danger. Yet, these classes would then inherit the advantages and
disadvantages of the standing army, which could be used by the elite to
counteract any opposition, whether internal or external." Moreover, once
the conflict subsided, the elite would be reluctant to relinquish their
newfound social control device."
Manning lamented the role that the laboring classes played in this
"dance," noting that "[s]o apt is mankind to be wrought up into a passion
by false reports and slight offenses that it is an easy matter for artful and
cunning men to set peaceable neighbors and families at variance with each
other where there are no grounds for it on either side."62 Manning clearly
felt the laboring classes were the victims of the elite's desire to maintain
their status in society.63 Once the elite established a standing army, the
middling classes would rely on that army, rather than the militia, for safety.
He believed that the laboring classes were so determined to protect their
Ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized Nation." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776). In this case, the "foreign Mercenaries" refer
to German Hessians imported to assist the British army. To clarify their abhorrence
for this practice, the founding fathers explicitly note that these forces are "large
Armies," conveying the notion of an intolerable force, rather than a virtuous militia.
See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration ofIndependence: A 225th Anniversary
Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REv. 701, 776 (2001).
5 MANNING, supra note 39, at 142.
'9 See id.
60 See id.
6 See id.
62 Id. at 142. Manning noted "[i]t is the universal custom and practice of
monarchical and arbitrary governments to train up their subjects as much in
ignorance as they can as to matters of government and policy, and to teach them to
reverence and worship great men in office and to take for truth whatever they say
without examining or trying to see for themselves." Id. at 138-39. Clearly, Manning
believed the educated elite who ran the establishment of nations, particularly
monarchies such as Great Britain, used the middling classes for the benefit of the
elite.63Id. at 139.
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nation and their homes that they ignored the likelihood that their willing-
ness to fight insurrection would lead to the evisceration of their liberties.'
Consequently, "the Few," in establishing a standing army, would gain a
tool to restrain the middling classes and to prevent any attempts at
insurrection.
The standing army and the ever-present state of war were common
realities for those living in both the American colonies and in Europe
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, during the
1640s, civil war erupted in England and by 1645, "Oliver Cromwell had
formed a massive army....,, In doing so, he "seize[d] power" from
Parliament and the King, and "assumed the role of a military dictator.. .. "'
To further enunciate the tumult that Manning, other colonists, and the
founding fathers felt between the years 1660-1801, Great Britain was in a
constant state of war.67 This constant state of war, which encompassed the
entire European landscape, was further complicated by inter-familial
alliances that often resulted in branches of the same royal family ruling
different nations, or even in distant relatives being at war with each other.68
Like William Manning, many individuals viewed this state of war as a
manufactured social state designed to entrench the standing army and to
protect against any and all attempts at social reform.69
64 See id.65 Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 11.
66Id.
67 During that time frame, Great Britain was involved in the following "laundry
list" of actions: the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67), the Third Anglo-Dutch
War (1672-74), the War of the Grand Alliance (1689-97), the War of the Spanish
Succession (1702-1713), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-20), the War
of the Austrian Succession (1739-48), the Seven Years' War (also known as the
French-Indian War, 1754-63), the American Revolution (1775-83), and the War
with revolutionary France (1793-180 1). John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics
by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
167, 212 (1996).
61 See, e.g., CHARLES W. INGRAO, THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1618-1815
(1994). The Habsburg Empire had its origins in the thirteenth century. In 1521,
Charles V divided the Habsburg Empire into two halves, one in Spain, the other in
Austria. Different Habsburgs continued ruling both branches until the Spanish
Habsburg dynasty came to an end in 1700 with the death of Charles II. Id.
69 It is no tall order for Manning to have concluded that these conflicts were
manufactured when these wars often pitted family against family. For example,
Great Britain fought two wars against the Dutch in the latter-half of the seventeenth
century. See Yoo, supra note 5, at 212. Yet, when, upon the birth of a son to James
II, the English were faced with the prospect of a line of Catholic kings, seven
prominent Englishmen implored William of Orange to invade England, promising
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Manning was also clearly cognizant of the recent abuses committed by
the British against the Americans.70 Like many American colonists, he
viewed the British army as a feared and loathsome object that preyed upon
American weaknesses.7 For example, prior to and during the American
Revolution, British soldiers quartered themselves in American homes
without compensating the inconvenienced Americans.72 Additionally,
during times of war, the British navy would force Americans into service
against their will aboard British naval vessels.73 This practice, known as
impressment, was explicitly condemned by the Declaration of Independ-
ence and, in part, fueled the rise of the American Revolution.7
Living in Massachusetts, and participating in the battle of Concord,
Manning could recall firsthand the British attempts to disarm the
colonists.75 In 1775, General Gage disarmed the population of Boston in the
name of the Crown. 76 Had the British succeeded in taking the right to bear
arms from the colonists in its entirety, the Americans would have been
subject to the whims of the standing army that remained in the colonies.77
In light of the threat of disarmament, Manning, when writing his manu-
script, believed in the individual right to bear arms .7 He advocated a militia
him support if he did. William of Orange, a Dutch nobleman, was married to Mary,
the sister of James II. In 1688, the future monarchs set sail for England with the
Dutch fleet and they took control in a bloodless coup d'etat known as the Glorious
Revolution. See Bogus, supra note 16, at 379-82.
7
1 See MANNING, supra note 39, at 15.
" See id.
72See The Quartering Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3; The Quartering Act, 1774, 15 Geo. 3.73 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1168 n.175 (1991).
74 Id. Akhil Reed Amar notes, "[i]n the later impressment debate leading to the
War of 1812, Secretary of State Monroe declared that impressment 'is not an
American practice, but is utterly repugnant to our Constitution.... ' "Id. (citing
28 ANNALS OF CONG. 81 (1814) (remarks of Senator Jeremiah Mason)).
75 See Hardy, supra note 8, at 25.
76 See Halbrook & Kopel, supra note 12, at 356. When occupying Philadelphia
in 1776, General Howe also disarmed the population in the name of the Crown. Id.
at 355.
" David C. Williams notes that, in part, the increases in taxation of the colonists
following the Seven Years' War went towards providing for a standing army.
Williams writes, "[tihe colonists were experiencing a republican nightmare: an
unrepresentative government was using a standing army against them to enforce an
unjust policy." Williams, supra note 5, at 573.
7s MANNING, supra note 39, at 142-43. Manning's preferred method of national
defense was a citizen-militia, which necessarily required every man, whether
wealthy or poor, to own firearms. Id.
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system of defense, which could not function without individuals responsi-
bly defending themselves and their nation. Moreover, Manning focused on
the abuses of the standing army and its position as a tool for the elite
classes. Like other Democrats, Manning believed that the individual right
to bear arms is one that is necessary for liberty.79 In fact, he might have
considered it to be the paramount liberty in that it provided the ability to
respond to abuses by the elite. Without the right to bear arms, the governing
elite would be free to restrain the liberties and rights of the laboring classes.
In writing about the standing army in his manuscript, William Manning
was shaped by Great Britain and its activities in the American colonies.
First, Manning clearly was a Democrat in that he wholeheartedly believed
that all men were equal and that all men should participate in governing.0
Second, Manning recognized the historical tradition of the British and the
ever-present sense of war that pervaded its eighteenth century society.8
Third, Manning clearly found the offenses of the British army distasteful
and unforgivable.82 Finally, and of significant note, Manning saw the
attempts at disarmament by the British prior to and during the American
Revolution as an intolerable example of the elite classes using the standing
army to subjugate the middling classes. 3 Although a member of "the
inarticulate class," William Manning recognized and valued his liberties;
he sought to ensure that they would never be suppressed:
III. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF THE INEFFECTUAL MILITIA CLAUSE
AND THE FAILURE OF MILITIA AS A MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
In drafting the Constitution and the Second Amendment, the founding
fathers navigated between their Scylla and Charybdis; in one respect, they
feared establishing a standing army; in the other, relying on the militia to
protect the nation would never prove effective. The founding fathers
79 Id. It should be noted that Manning rejected uprisings such as the Shays
Rebellion in which rebels had alternate means to resolve their dispute through the
democratic process. Id. at 6.
1o See id. at 5.
81 Id. at 14 (expressions regarding the traditions of the British, including
conduct viewed as tyrannical, had "deep roots in the political vernacular of the
Massachusetts countryside, dating back to the seventeenth century.").
82 Id. at 15. In response to the Coercive Acts, Billericans, residents of the town
where Manning resided, believed "the Crown and Parliament were attempting to
'dragoon us into slavery because we disdain patiently to take the yoke upon our
neck."' Id.
83 See Hardy, supra note 8, at 13-16.
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believed that a standing army might trample upon the liberties of the
populace." Although they understood the military advantages of such an
army, they were reluctant to pursue that option because of the injustices
they suffered at the hands of the British army. 5
During the. Revolution, however, the militia proved that it was not
capable of succeeding against a better-equipped standing army. 6 Early in
the war, statesmen believed militia would be an adequate foil to the British
standing army because while the standing army was an institution of
oppression, the militia represented a virtuous armed citizenry. 7 Yet
frequent defeats, poor training, and inadequate leadership demonstrated that
the militia would not serve as an adequate means to repel the British. 8
Notwithstanding the failures of the militia during the Revolutionary
War, the founding fathers clearly maintained hope that the militia would
play an important role in the security of the nation. 9 Despite this hope, they
provided the federal government with the authority to establish a standing
army." These provisions of the Constitution, however, caused a great
uproar with many statesmen, who feared such power could lead to
tyrannical oppression by an overbearing government. Specifically, many
statesmen of the early republic had a firm and cemented fear of standing
armies due to their observations of established standing armies in the Old
.4 For example, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison noted, "[suppose that
we] [let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and
let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still it would not be
going too far to say that the State governments with the people on their side would
be able to repel the danger ... [having] half a million citizens with arms in their
hands...." THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999). Saint George Tucker noted, "[w]herever standing armies are kept up, and
the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of
destruction." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *300.
85 CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL
ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-76, at 17 (1979).
16 See Bogus, supra note 16, at 340-42.
87 ROYSTER, supra note 85, at 37-40.
" See, e.g., Bogus, supra note 16, at 340-42.
89 See Cottrol & Diamond, The SecondAmendment, supra note 11, at 329-30.
Alexander Hamilton, although believing the militia had "fought bravely" in the
Revolution, concluded they were no match for battle-proven regulars. Hamilton
hoped the militia would be uniformly organized and controlled under national
authority. Id. at 329. Madison's views on the militia were more extensive, believing
the militia should consist of nearly the entire white male population. Id at 330.
90 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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World.9" For example, George Mason felt the protection of the militia must
be established so that the use of standing armies would be restricted.92
Thus, in order to limit the criticism that the new document suffered, the
drafters promised a bill of rights that would firmly entrench the people with
liberties not expressly included in the Constitution, so as to protect the
populace against intrusions upon fundamental liberties by the govern-
ment.
A. National Defense in the Context ofthe Militia and the Native American
Campaign of the Ohio River Valley
The United States, when acting against "hostile" Indian groups, relied
upon a militia system as a means of national defense. Thesystem obligated
white male citizens of proper age who owned property to protect the needs
of the state.93 It required men to assemble on a schedule devised by the
local government, between once a week and once a season, for inspection
9' In discussing the proposed amendments to the Constitution, Representative
Elbridge Gerry stated, "[w]hat, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the
establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty .... Whenever Governments
mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy
the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins. This was actually done by
Great Britain at the commencement of the late revolution." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
778 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
George Mason noted that "unless there be some restrictions on the power of
calling forth the militia ... we may very easily see that it will produce dreadful
oppressions .... This would harass the people so much that they would agree to
abolish the use of the militia, and establish a standing army." In response to the
potential for standing armies, Mason exclaimed, "I abominate and detest the idea
of a government, where there is a standing army." 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 378-79 (1836) (statements of George Mason, June
14, 1788)). These comments were made in response to the notion that the Federal
government would have authority over state militias. Mason clearly felt that the
federal government should have no such authority, demanding, "the consent of the
state legislatures ought to be had." Id. at 378. In response, James Madison noted,
"I most cordially agree, with the honorable member last up, that a standing army
is one of the greatest mischiefs that can possibly happen. It is a great recommenda-
tion for this system, that it provides against this evil more than any system known
to us, and, particularly, more than the old system of confederation." Id. at 381
(emphasis added).
92 See Hardy, supra note 8, at 50.
93 Allan R. Millett, The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier, in THE UNITED
STATES MILITARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989,
98 (Richard H. Kohn ed., 1991).
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of arms.94 These citizens were responsible for furnishing weapons with
ammunition and, upon verification of proper training, completing their
scheduled service. 5 However, reliance upon a militia as a system of
national defense was inherently flawed. For example, wealthy individuals
were permitted to pay poor individuals to cover their military obligation.96
Those who were paid for their service frequently squandered their money
and failed to provide the defensive capabilities necessary of a common
soldier. Unlike regulars, the men who composed the militias were generally
deficient in military training and lacked respect for their officers. 97 The
flaws of the militia system left the United States and its territories with a
dearth of properly trained soldiers.
As evidenced by the militia's failures during the American Revolution,
"by the 1790's, the old colonial militia had become an obsolete
institution." 98 Washington himself believed that "[t]o place any dependance
upon Militia is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff."" The militiamen
justified his contention when, during the Revolutionary campaigns of 1776
and 1777, the militia consistently failed to fight, much less defeat, the
regulars of the British army. " Yet, following the victorious Revolution, the
weak central government established under the Articles of Confederation
continued to rely on a militia system as a means of national defense.'0 '
Following the adoption of the Constitution, the United States embarked
on a campaign to free the Northwest Territory from the hostile Indian
tribes. Yet, two dramatic defeats served to illustrate the inadequacies of the
American militia system. First, General Josiah Harmar led a group of
militia against Native Americans in the Ohio frontier, only to be soundly
94 id.
95id.
961d. at 102.
97 RICHARD KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD 137 (1975). Historian Richard Kohn
notes that the militias were "[d]esigned as local defense forces to protect against
Indian raids, foreign invasion, and domestic disorder." Id. He further notes that as
the frontier moved westward and as the British increasingly used their army in
America, the militias "beg[a]n to lose their relevance." Id.
98 Id. Kohn notes that upon gaining its independence, the United States "needed
a military capable of opposing European armies and moving offensively to break
Indian power in the West." Id. Kohn clearly believed that the militias could not
function as a means to counter such threats.
9 Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress, Sept. 24, 1776,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammen/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit
(gw060089).
1oo Bogus, supra note 16, at 340-44.
... See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, cl. 4 (repealed 1787).
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defeated. Second, in late 1791, Arthur St. Clair led a large army of ill-
trained militia against a stronger contingent of Native Americans, only to
be smarted in one of the worst losses in American history. These losses,
along with those suffered by the militia in the American Revolution,
indicated that the militia would never be a capable means of national
defense.
In 1790, General Josiah Harmar and his army of militia were soundly
defeated by a loose confederation of Native American tribes. Following the
drubbing of his forces at the hands of the Indians, General Harmar blamed
his defeat on "the shameful conduct of the militia who threw away their
arms and would not fight."' 2 In defending his leadership, Harmar argued
that holding the militiamen under any degree of control was an "arduous
task."'0 3 He further claimed that once the militia felt secure in their status,
they became "ungovernable" by military authorities.0 4 Not only did the
inadequacies of the militiamen prevent American victory, but the failures
of the militia adversely affected the performance of other soldiers in the
army.1
0 5
The stinging American defeat at the hands of the Native Americans,
along with the danger to Kentucky,0 6 the nation's newest state, catalyzed
congressional action providing for the creation of a regiment of nearly one
thousand men on March 3, 1791.7 Following the aforementioned
congressional action, President Washington nominated Arthur St. Clair as
the leader of the newly commissioned army. St. Clair's task was to
assemble a capablearmy and initiate a fresh campaign against the hostile
102 HARVEY LEWIS CARTER, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LITTLE TURTLE 95 (1987).
103 BEVERLEY W. BOND, JR., HISTORY OF THE STATE OF OHIO, VOL. I: FOUNDA-
TIONS OF OHIO 320 (Carl Wittke ed., 1941).
104 Id.
105 WILBUR EDEL, KEKIONGA! THE WORST DEFEAT IN THE HISTORY OF THE U.S.
ARMY 81 (1997) (One officer noted, "the regulars being left unsupported fell
nearly the whole."); see, e.g., CARTER, supra note 102, at 93, 95.
106 On February 3, 1791, Kentucky was admitted as the fifteenth state in the
union. As Native Americans increased their attacks along the Ohio River, these
confrontations suddenly had increased prominence because the attacks were now
a threat to national security, rather than attacks in a remote territory. See EDEL,
supra note 105, at 85.
107 1 Stat. 222 (1791) (repealed 1795). This act also allowed the President to
raise "a corps not exceeding two thousand non-commissioned officers, privates and
musicians" for use to protect the nation's borders, including Kentucky. Id. at 223.
While Congress approved an enlarged army, it did not act to reform the inadequa-
cies that were apparent in the nation's reliance on militia as a means of national
security. Id. at 222-23.
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Indians of the Ohio River Valley. However, St. Clair's recruitment of
soldiers "'was not a careful selection of picked men but rather a hurried
and futile attempt to gather together whatever willing specimens the
recruiting officers could find."" 08 Like other armies relying on militia,
soldiers in St. Clair's army frequently had arms and equipment that were
"'unfit for use.' ,109
In the early morning of November 4, 1791, a loose confederation of
Native Americans under the leadership of Little Turtle attacked and
annihilated the American army led by St. Clair. "° The Native Americans
"concentrated their shots on the active officers," leaving the militia without
effective leadership."' The militia's response was lethargic; St. Clair's
adjutant noted that "[t]he resistance of the militia deserves not the name of
defense, but should be branded as the most ignominious flight.""' 2 After
roughly three hours of intense fighting, the American army fled, leaving
630 men dead and 184 wounded." 3
The utter defeat of the American army at the hands of the Native
Americans caused great alarm.' "' In order to avoid repeating the previous
debacles that occurred in the Northwest Territory, President Washington
and his cabinet took careful measures to ensure full development of the
army. Congress passed "[a]n Act for making farther and more effectual
Provision for the Protection of the Frontiers of the United States."' '15 That
Act "raised for a term not exceeding three years, three additional regiments,
each of which, exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall consist of
nine hundred and sixty non-commissioned officers, privates and musi-
cians."I 6 The Act was specifically passed to counter the Native American
threat, noting "[t]hat the said three regiments shall be discharged as soon
108 EDEL, supra note 105, at 87 (quoting WILLIAM H. GUTHMAN, MARCH TO
MASSACRE: A HISTORY OF THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY,
1784-1791, 210 (1975)).
'09 Id. (quoting 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 37 (1792)).
"
0 Id. at 88.
"'. CARTER, supra note 102, at 102.
112 EDEL, supra note 105, at 89.
"Id. St. Clair's defeat stands as one of the worst catastrophes in American
military history. At no time before, nor since, did the United States ever suffer a
more disastrous defeat at the hands of the Native Americans. See, e.g., id. (noting
630 died and 184 were injured in the battle).
"' Despite limited circulation of written publications, word of mouth brought
the American populace to an uproar over St. Clair's defeat. DAVE R. PALMER,
1794: AMERICA, ITS ARMY, AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION 203 (1994).
111 1 Stat. 241 (1792).
116Id.
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as the United States shall be at peace with the Indian tribes."" 7 Not only
did this congressional action create the army Washington desired, it also
increased the pay of the soldiers and instituted an enlistment bonus." 8 In
doing so, the newly minted standing army instantly had advantages that
previous forces lacked"'9
After months of preparation and training, General "Mad" Anthony
Wayne led the American army, composed of federal volunteers and
regulars, against a loosely organized Native American confederation
estimated at greater than 1000 braves on the morning of August 20, 1794.;20
Using superior military tactics, General Wayne led his forces to an
invaluable victory. Wayne chased his combatants to a local British fort,
which refused admittance to the Native Americans.' 2' Not only had the
Indians been defeated by the Americans, but they had been betrayed by
their former allies, the British. The Native Americans would never again
have a strong presence in the Ohio River Valley; moreover, westward
expansion immediately increased with dramatic results. 22 In a single day,
1171d.
"8 Id. at 242.
1t should be noted that in 1792, Congress passed the Uniform Militia Act of
1792, which attempted to reform the American militia system. KOHN, supra note
97, at 135. With the exception of one historian, military historians and analysts
have nearly universally emphasized the weaknesses of the bill. Id. at 352 n.28. The
act made very limited reforms to the militia which proved insufficient. Richard
Kohn notes that "[n]othing in the law, however, guaranteed training or even
uniformity of structure and equipment." Id. at 135. The act "imposed no fines for
malfeasance, against the states or individual militia, nor did the law establish any
special officers to report on militia affairs to the President or Congress." Id.
121 See EDEL, supra note 105 (although estimates vary considerably, some
believe as many as 2000 Indians were gathered prior to the Battle of Fallen
Timbers); PAuL DAVID NELSON & ANTHONY WAYNE, SOLDIER OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC 265 (1985) (noting Anthony Wayne estimated that he faced 1000 braves
and about 60 Canadian militiamen).
"2 See Richard Baltin, "Mad Anthony" Wayne at Fallen Timbers, in 1 EARLY
AM. REV. (Fall 1996), available at http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/fal196/
anthony.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
122 N.E. JONES, THE SQUIRREL HUNTERS OF OHIO OR, GLIMPSES OF PIONEER
LIFE 1 (1897). Jones argued that "[flrom the time the Mayflower landed at Fort
Harmar (Marietta) in 1788 until 1795, emigration had not materially increased the
population of the North-west, owing to the unstable and dissatisfied condition of
the Indians." Id. at 2.
The appearance of peace, however, changed the dynamic of the American
Northwest by facilitating the widespread immigration of settlers into the territory.
The defeat of the confederation at Fallen Timbers along with the peace established
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the inadequacies of the militia system were exemplified, while the United
States, with its standing army, secured its borders from possible incursions
by Native Americans and European forces.
The successful outcome at Fallen Timbers crippled the use of the
militia system as a means of national defense for the United States.'23
Throughout the American Revolution and the campaigns against the
Indians of the Ohio River Valley, the militia proved unreliable and
ineffective. 24 The failures of the militia in the Harmar and St. Clair
campaigns were dramatically contrasted by the dramatic victory by General
Anthony Wayne and his army composed of federal volunteers and regulars.
Where doubt had once lingered, the decisive victory in the Northwest
revealed the advantages of a standing army to the public. Although those
skeptical of a standing army remained highly suspicious, Federalists
increasingly promoted it as a necessity that represented the only military
institution capable of repelling foreign threats and protecting the frontier. 
25
with the Treaty of Greenville, negotiated in 1795, suddenly transformed the
Northwest Territory from a sleepy frontier area to a booming sector of migration
and economic growth. Historian Gary Walton notes that in 1790 the population of
American settlers in Ohio was negligible. Yet, within a decade, the Ohio
population had grown to over forty-five thousand. This dramatic increase continued
throughout the following decade when, in 1810, the Ohio population grew to over
two hundred thirty thousand Americans. Gary M. Walton, River Transportation
and the Old Northwest Territory, in ESSAYS IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ECONOMIC
HISTORY: THE OLD NORTHWEST 228 (David C. Klingaman & Richard K. Vedder
eds., Ohio Univ. Press 1987). The influx of immigration to the territory qualified
Ohio for statehood shortly after it gained territorial status. See id. at 225-28. The
dramatic population advances that occurred in the Ohio Territory occurred only
after Anthony Wayne and the army brought peace to the American northwest.
'23 The militia system would remain a potential means of national defense for
years to come. "During the War of 1812, neither the standing army nor the militia"
performed exceptionally well during battle. However, it should be noted that in
the Battle of New Orleans, following the end of the War of 1812, "[m]ilitia...
under Andrew Jackson, at that point a regular army officer, handily defeated the
regular British army." However, at other times during the war, "militias of several
states refused to leave the United States to invade Canada." James Biser Whisker,
The Citizen-Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REv. 947, 965
(1992).
124 See KOHN, supra note 97, at 137. Kohn concludes that "[t]he calls for reform
which began in 1783 and culminated in the act of 1792 revealed that many
Americans sensed the inability of state institutions, poorly coordinated, badly
disciplined, and casually armed, to meet the needs of the new republic." Id.
121 Id. at 280.
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Thus, the victory in the Northwest revealed that the militia system was
ineffectual as a means of national defense and catalyzed the adoption of the
standing army as the military institution that would protect the nation.
126
B. National Defense in the Context of the Militia and the Whiskey
Rebellion
In 1792, Congress enacted the Uniform Militia Act, which President
George Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox had hoped would
reform the militia system to make it a more adequate means of national
defense. 2 7 However, Congress hollowed out the vast majority of the bill,
eliminating nearly every part that Washington and Knox viewed as vital. 1
28
Also in 1792, Congress enacted an act that "define[d] procedures for
federalizing state militias."' 29 The act provided that in instances of state
insurrection, the President was permitted to call forth the state militias, so
long as the legislative or executive branch of each state had expressly
permitted presidential action.3 ° However, before the President would be
permitted to act, he had to send out a "cease-and-desist proclamation," as
well as have a federal judge certify that the insurrection was beyond repair
by civil authorities.'
The most important test of this new emergency use of the federalized
militia occurred just two years later, in 1794. In response to what they
viewed as intolerable taxes on spirits, citizens in western Pennsylvania,
near Pittsburgh, violently rebelled against excise collectors.132 In July 1794,
Washington and his administration learned of the recent attack and sought
126 For a more thorough analysis regarding the Battle of Fallen Timbers, its
legacy, and its economic effects upon American expansion into the Northwest
Territory, see Haydn J. Richards, Jr., The Battle of Fallen Timbers: Its Effects
Upon American Westward Expansion and the Legitimacy of the United States.
(1999) (unpublished Honors Thesis, College of William and Mary) (on file with
author).
327 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
.28 Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected Aspect of
Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. 39, 53 (Jan. 1998). The
Congressional action taken in the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 is generally viewed
as insufficient. Most contemporaries of that era viewed the act as a failure. KOHN,
supra note 97, at 136.
'29Higginbotham, supra note 128, at 53.
'30 See 1 Stat. 264 (1792).
'3' Higginbotham, supra note 128, at 53.
132 Id. at4.
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to ensure a quick response.'33 In early August, Washington issued a
proclamation demanding the rebels disperse and then notified the governors
of several states of his intention to call up the militia to quell the distur-
bance. 34 In response to the violence in Pennsylvania, President Washington
called forth 15,000 men in the militias of four neighboring states.' Militias
from New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia were dispatched, and Washing-
ton, along with Alexander Hamilton, joined the federalized militia to
provide leadership.'36 Within two months, the rebellion had ended and the
vast majority of the militia had withdrawn and returned home. 37
The Whiskey Rebellion and the federalized militia proved an important
event to the early republic. However, in most circles, the rebellion is
viewed "as a milestone in the creation of federal authority," rather than as
a significant accomplishment of the militia system. 3 The Whiskey
Rebellion, as an internal, societal uprising, was an ideal candidate for use
of militia. Although use of militia was generally restricted to interstate
activity, the insurrection in Pennsylvania posed a direct threat to the
security of its neighboring states. By federalizing the militias of those
states, Washington assembled a force that could put down the rebellion
simply by sheer numbers.
Despite the successful efforts by the militia in quelling internal strife,
the actions of the militia during the-Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated little
in terms of national defense. First, Congress would never engage in
meaningful militia reform, despite its frequent attempts to re-tool the
existing system.'39 Second, the campaign in Pennsylvania was quite short
and the militias were sent back to their home states relatively quickly.
4
1
Due to the brief nature of the campaign, many of the problems that
traditionally plagued the militia did not occur.' 4' Third, since the rebellion
133 see Richard Kohn, The Washington Administration's Decision to Crush the
Whiskey Rebellion, 59 J. AM. HIsT. 567, 568 (1972).
134 Id. at 575-76.
135 KOHN, supra note 97, at 135.
136 Id. at 169.
131 Id. at 170.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 136. Richard Kohn notes that "[a]ttempts were made to change the law
in virtually every session for the next three decades, but Congress never acted." Id.
He further notes that any revisions to the system "would have forced changes many
states did not want, worked hardships on special groups, and certainly increased the
burden on voters." Id.
'40 See id. at 170.
141 See id. at 75.
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took place within the borders of Pennsylvania, the militias did not need to
leave the United States. As such, Washington did not need to worry about
state militias refusing to travel outside the borders of the country (a
problem that would arise during the War of 1812). 142 Fourth, since the
insurrection in western Pennsylvania threatened neighboring states, the
legislatures and governors of those states were readily convinced to provide
for the mobilization of their state militias. However, if the conflict had not
posed a threat to individual surrounding states, legislatures and governors
might have been reluctant to mobilize their militias. Thus, they could
effectively cripple any federal governmental response to a national threat.
Finally, the leadership of George Washington, who led the nation to
independence as the Commander-in-Chief of the American forces during
the Revolutionary War, should not be discounted.
IV. THE SECOND AMENDMENT, SLAVERY, AND THE SOUTH
A. Gun Control and Social Control in the Antebellum South
The Second Amendment must, at least in part, convey an individual
right to keep and bear firearms. In their seminal work, Robert Cottrol and
Raymond Diamond analyze the careful blend of racial politics that played
a role in the origin and importance of the Second Amendment.1 43 They
contend that the right to keep and bear arms in Colonial America served as
a distinct means of racially subjugating Africans and Native Americans.144
Specifically, Cottrol and Diamond argue that "an armed and universally
deputized white population was necessary" to protect whites from
European powers and Native Americans and to maintain effective control
over slaves."I According to the scholars, it was necessary for the white
population to own and operate firearms to protect their populations from a
plethora of potentially hostile groups. 46
142 See Whisker, supra note 123, at 965.
143 Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11. Several efforts
have since evaluated the role of Africans, slavery, and the effects of gun control
initiatives. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, Never Intended to be Applied, supra note
17; Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 17 (1995); Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON
U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 67 (1991).
'44 Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11, at 324.
145 Id.
14 Id.
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Cottrol and Diamond posit that the legislation emerging from the
Second Amendment cultivated racial subjugation so that the southern states
would possess an effective means of control over their expansive slave
populations. 4 ' Specifically, the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 delineated the
enrollment of state militias and implicitly forbade all non-whites from
participating in the militia.4 Cottrol and Diamond recognize the possibility
that the Second Amendment, along with the Uniform Militia Act, served as
a means of controlling large African populations in southern states by
encouraging firearm ownership and white participation in citizen militias.'49
Moreover, according to the scholars, while the slave codes provided the
legal mechanism to suppress slaves, 5 ' the militia served as an active means
to intimidate Africans and thwart any mob opposition. 5' Thus, an armed
citizenry protected southern states from slave rebellion and mobilized
militia groups served to suppress the slaves and prevent any uprising."2
The heightened awareness of slave rebellion in the South polarized
southern planters, making them apprehensive of any opposition to slavery.
During the eighteenth century, the militia increasingly took the responsibil-
ity of maintaining and regulating slave patrols.'53 The concern over slave
rebellion was great enough that southern states "often refused to commit
their militia to the [American] Revolution, reserving them instead for slave
control."'' " Moreover, following the American Revolution, southern states
feared any possibility of slave uprising and consequently, used any means
necessary to entrench the system of slavery. 55 Akhil Reed Amar notes that
'"" Id. at 325. For example, over 290,000 African slaves lived in Virginia in the
era immediately following the adoption of the United States Constitution. See
GARY B. NASH, RACE AND REVOLUTION 43 (1990).
141 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
41 See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11, at 331.
'
5o See id. at 336-37.
'Id. at 331.
152One scholar noted that" '[s]lavery was not only an economic and industrial
system,' ... 'but more than that, it was a gigantic police system."' Bogus, supra
note 16, at 335 (quoting H.M. HENRY, THE POLICE CONTROL OF THE SLAVE IN
SOUTH CAROLINA 154-55 (1968)).
53 id.
154Id. at 336.
' Fearing the potential for free blacks to assist their enslaved brothers,
southern states "limited the number of free blacks who might congregate at one
time; they curtailed the ability of free blacks to choose their own employment, and
to trade and socialize with slaves." Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment,
supra note 11, at 336 (footnotes omitted). In the antebellum South, free blacks
were a persecuted minority; they clearly did not enjoy rights comparable to even
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"[t]he structural imperatives of the peculiar institution led slave states to
violate virtually every 'right' and 'freedom' declared in the Bill [of
Rights]." 56 Since the South increasingly viewed itself as "under siege,"'57
it enacted gun control measures aimed at restricting firearms access to all
minority groups, including free blacks and Native Americans.
The history of gun control in southern states is one of racism. The
governments of southern states sought to maintain a repugnant social
structure based on slavery; in doing so, the southerners needed to maintain
a disarmed slave population.'58 Without the ability to forcibly resist, the
slave population would continue to subsist in a system of forced bondage.
In the South, the state militias were truly a defensive force; they were
poised to counteract any slave uprising. Thus, in the South, with the ever-
present threat of rebellion, the right to firearm ownership was a necessary
fact of life for white planters, and a non-existent right for blacks. In
application, the Second Amendment proved to be a selective right in the
South. It clearly conveyed an individual right to bear arms; however, this
right was limited to white southerners, who needed firearms as protection
in the event of rebellion.
B. The Constitution of the Confederate States ofAmerica
Existing between 1861 and 1865, the Confederate States of America
represents the failed attempt at revolution by eleven southern states. 159 In
the poorest of whites.
156 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALEL.J. 1193, 1216 (1992).
'Id. Amar notes that following Nat Turner's rebellion, southern states strictly
limited access to firearms, particularly access by free blacks. Id. When news of a
slave revolt on St. Domingue reached Virginia, even Thomas Jefferson noted that,
without adequate reform to the institution of slavery, "'the revolutionary storm,
now sweeping the globe, will be upon us."' NASH, supra note 147, at 46. Saint
George Tucker, another statesman of Virginia, believed that the heightened
rebelliousness of African slaves "'afford a solemn warning to us of the dangerous
predicament in which we stand."' Id. at 44.
' See generally Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11,
at 335-38 (noting that the government's historical failure to protect the liberties of
black Americans makes gun control claims dubious).
"5 9 See generally E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States ofAmerica 1861-
1865, in 7 A HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (Wendell Holmes Stephenson & E. Merton
Coulter eds., 1950) (discussing all aspects of Confederate history during the Civil
War); CLEMENT EATON, A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY (1961)
(discussing the political, social, and military history of the Confederacy). It should
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their desire to promote states' rights and continue their legacy of slavery,
the states seceded and established a government in Richmond, Virginia,
that was "highly similar" to the federal government in Washington. 6 They
modeled their constitution after the United States Constitution, and,
consequently, both documents are quite similar.'61 In fact, Southerners
viewed succession and their new constitutional system as a restoration
rather than a revolution. 62 By modeling their constitution upon the United
States Constitution, southerners aimed to keep all the institutions of
government that proved successful following the American Revolution,
while reverting to a government based upon the states' rights model.'63
Southerners were not against the structure and effect of the United
States Constitution; instead, they took issue with the "implementation and
interpretation [of the Constitution] by the Supreme Court."'" For the most
part, the Confederates left much of what was the United States Constitution
unchanged.'65 In shaping their document, "[t]he drafters of the Confederate
Constitution may well have thought of themselves as largely improving,
rather than replacing, the federal constitution.""6 Although the Confederate
Constitution that emerged was virtually identical to that of the United
States, its subtle differences reveal key areas of disagreement between the
southerners and the Union. 1
67
be noted that thousands of works have been published on the United States.Civil
War.
16o See Ralph Michael Stein, The South Won 'tRiseAgain But It's Time to Study
the Defunct Confederacy's Constitution, 21 PACE L. REv. 395, 395 (2001).
161 For further information regarding the American Constitutional tradition and
the intentions of the framers of the Confederate Constitution, see Donald Nieman,
Republicanism, the Confederate Constitution, and the American Constitutional
Tradition, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY
OF THE SOUTH 201 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
162 See Stein, supra note 160, at 398.
163 See id. at 401 ("The impetus for secession, and what was perceived by
Northerners as the restoration of a dishonored constitution and federal system that
insured primacy of the individual subscribing states, surged after the Dred Scott
decision and its accompanying debates.").
64 1 d. at 402.
165 James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the
Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in ConstitutionalArgument, 76
TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1261 (1998) (arguing the Confederate Constitution is "virtually
word-for-word identical" with the United States Constitution).
6 Stein, supra note 160, at 402.
167 Carl Degler noted, "'what is striking about the Confederacy is how con-
gruent its institutions and political values were with those of the United
States.'" Gardner, supra note 165, at 1260. Since the two governments were so
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The most significant and noteworthy aspect of the Confederate
Constitution is the pervasive inclusion of the states' rights model of
government.1 68 As early as its preamble, the document articulates the
dominance of this concept, noting that "each State acting in its sovereign
and independent character" commiserated and formed the Confederacy.'
69
Unlike the United States Constitution, which was established by "the
people," the Confederate Constitution was formed by the eleven states of
the Confederacy. 70 Thus the textual language of the Constitution indicates
that southerners viewed the Confederacy as severable. Since institutions,
rather than the populace, formed the government, individual states, led by
"the people," could withdraw from the Confederacy.
The dominance of the states' rights model of government is not limited
to the Confederate Constitution's preamble. For example, the last two
clauses of Article VI of the Confederate Constitution correspond directly
to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The
Confederate Constitution notes, "[t]he enumeration, in the Constitution, of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people ofthe several States.""7' The document then notes, "[t]he powers
not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people
thereof.""' In clause 5, the Confederate Constitution explicitly notes that
highly similar, the subtle differences between the two prove of even greater
importance.
16' The Confederate Constitution drops all subtlety when discussing the
institution of slavery. The document retained the three-fifths compromise and made
the importation of slaves illegal. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 1-2. It should be noted that the document's treatment of the institution of
slavery is noteworthy in itself; however, it will not be discussed because it is
beyond the scope of this article. For an illustrative discussion of the South's
determination to increase the legal protection of slavery, please see Robert J.
Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of a Racial
Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 76 TUL. L. REv. 11 (2001).
169 CONFEDERATE CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added), available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/csa/csa.htm(last modified Nov. 7. 2002).
'°Id. (Although the preamble to the Confederate Constitution begins with "We,
the people," it then recognizes the role of "each State acting in its sovereign and
independent character.").
"' Id. art. VI, cl. 5 (emphasis added). The corresponding section in the United
States Constitution, Amendment IX, reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
172 CONFEDERATE CONST. art. VI, cl. 6 (emphasis added). The corresponding
section, in the United States Constitution, Amendment X, reads: "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
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the rights are reserved to the people of the individual states. In clause 6, the
Confederate Constitution uses the term "thereof" to modify "the people,"
making it clear that unenumerated powers are left to the people of the
individual states. The Confederate Constitution focused on the rights of the
states, sothat the people of any state could oppose the federal government
should that government burden the state. Both modifications noted above
confer rights to the people as citizens of individual states, rather than in
their capacity as a national citizenry. Moreover, the explicit alteration of
the original language of the United States Constitution serves as evidence
that the Confederate government was not constitutionally superior to the
governments of the individual states.'73
The Confederate States of America also included the provisions of
the United States Bill of Rights within its Constitution.'74 Since the
Confederate Constitution was not meant to curb the overall autonomy of
the states, the rights provided within the document were viewed as
essential, natural rights, which no state could deny its citizens.'75 Among
the many rights-conveying provisions included in the Confederate
Constitution is the unaltered text of the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 76 The inclusion of this provision in the Confederate
Constitution offers great insight into the Confederates' view of that
amendment and the antebellum status of the right to keep and bear arms.
Collective rights scholars argue that the Second Amendment only
conveys an institutional right to beararms for the benefit of citizen militias.
Let us assume, arguendo, that these scholars are correct in their belief that
the framers only conveyed a collective right to bear arms. This position
results in an academic quagmire. If the right were so limited, the drafters
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend
X.
13 See MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861, 40
(1991). These alterations are a representative sample of some of the adjustments
made in the Confederate Constitution. For additional information regarding the
differences in both constitutions, see id. at 38-56.
'" The first eight amendments to the United States Constitution were
transcribed into Article I, § 9 of the Confederate Constitution. See id. at 64. The
latter two amendments of the Bill of Rights were placed in Article VI of the
Confederate Constitution. See id. at 39.
' Under the system outlined in the Confederate Constitution, the states had
dominion over all rights that were not explicitly enumerated in the Confederate
Constitution. See id. at 64.
176 CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 13. Clause 13 reads: "A well-regulated
militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed."
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of the Confederate Constitution would have had little motivation for
including it in their Constitution.
First, if one interprets the Second Amendment to convey only a
collective right to arms, one must inherently set aside the states' rights
model of government that was so dear to the Confederacy. As argued by
collective rights' scholars, the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution served to arm the militia as a means of national defense.1
77
Yet, when applied to the Confederate Constitution, such a result flies in the
face of the act of secession by the Confederate States. In drafting their
Constitution, the ultimate desire of the Confederate States of America was
to ensure that the states, rather than the federal government, had ultimate
authority in nearly all matters. 7 1 However, when applying the collective
rights interpretation to Article I, § 9, clause 13 of the Confederate
Constitution, we arrive at a provision that inexplicably removes a degree
of autonomy from the several States. This directly contradicts the intent of
the drafters of the Confederate Constitution.' Under the states' rights
model, rather than limiting state autonomy over their individual militias, the
Confederacy would have instead preferred each state to set forth provisions
regarding the state militias in their respective constitutions.
Second, only the most fundamental rights were provided for in the
Confederate Constitution. 8 ° Thus the Confederate Constitution, which was
based on a states' rights model of government, must be seen as explicitly
reproducing the United States Constitution's Second Amendment as a
means of conveying an individual right to keep and bear arms for southern
whites.' The Confederates would not have provided this right unless it
was essential-it had to be of paramount importance to the southern
antebellum experience. In southern society, the individual right to bear
arms was a daily necessity in that it provided them with a means of
protection against the reality of slave insurrection.'82 Southerners lived in
'1 See, e.g., Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 11, at 57.
178 See DEROSA, supra note 173, at 5.
179 CONFEDERATE CONST. pmbl. Intent to preserve state autonomy is inferred
from the southerners' insertion of the clause "each State acting-in its sovereign and
independent character."
180 See DEROSA, supra note 173, at 64.
.8. CONFEDERATE CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 13.
182 The "wave of slave insurrection panics and reprisals that swept the South
after the Harper's Ferry raid" served to heighten the paranoia of the South
regarding the potential of slave unrest. David W. Blight, They Knew What Time It
Was: African-Americans and the Coming of the Civil War, in WHY THE CIVIL WAR
CAME 71 (Gabor S. Boritt ed., 1996). John Brown, by raiding Harper's Ferry, in
his attempt to arm enslaved Africans, "laid bare the deepest racial fears and social
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constant fear of their enslaved population; in many areas, the number of
enslaved Africans was greater than that of free whites. 83 In order to
counteract the threat posed by these large populations of enslaved Africans,
southern governments purposely disarmed free blacks and slaves.'8
Moreover, they used slave patrols and state militias as de facto police
forces, aimed at restraining any form of social discord. 8 Southern society
was one reliant on social control; southerners clung to their firearms while
ruling over a disarmed, enslaved population. Without the ability to use
firearms to control the disarmed population that provided its immediate
threat, southerners, and their repugnant institution, could not survive.
Consequently, the Confederate Constitution reproduces the Second
Amendment as a clause that conveys an individual right to keep and bear
arms, a provision that was essential to the southern way of life.
V. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
THE INCORPORATION DEBATE, AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Historical and legal sources reveal that in the antebellum United States
the Second Amendment was viewed as an individual right that provided
insecurities of white Southerners." Id. During 1860, Georgians succumbed to a
"general 'mob psychosis,"' which took over both their "political and social lives."
Moreover, hysteria mounted over fears spawned "by the Texas insurrection panic
of the summer of [1860], in which approximately fifty blacks and whites died in
vigilante violence." Id.
'83 Michael P. Mills, Slave Law in Mississippifrom 1817-1861: Constitutions,
Codes and Cases, 71 MIss. L.J. 153, 160-61 (2001) (notingin 1860, thepopulation
of Mississippi consisted of 353,899 whites and 436,631 slaves. The article further
notes that in some countries, slaves outnumbered whites by more than ten to one.);
Thomas D. Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1241, 1249, 1251 (1993) (discussing slave population in South
Carolina and noting that by 1860, the state's Edgefield district's slave population
had risen to 60.3% slave (from 48.6% slave in 1820), the state's Fairfield district's
population had risen to 70.3% slave (from 45.1% slave in 1820), and the state's
Malboro and Union districts were 52% slave in 1850).
'" See Cottrol & Diamond, The Second Amendment, supra note 11, at 335-36.
According to Professors Cottrol and Diamond, free blacks posed a twofold threat
to the southern institution of slavery. First, free blacks were a bad example to
slaves, in that they had a great degree of freedom. The scholars note that the
example of free blacks served to expand the horizons of slaves, potentially
fostering rebellious visions of freedom. Second, free blacks threatened the South
by potentially "instigat[ing] orparticpat[ing] in a rebellion by their slave brethren."
Id. at 335.
' See id. at 336.
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people with the ability to own and utilize firearms. The enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, altered the constitutional framework in
which we view the rights provided by the Bill of Rights. Specifically, the
Due Processclause of the Fourteenth Amendment acts is the tool whereby
the fundamental guarantees provided by the Bill of Rights extend and apply
to the states. There are three predominant approaches regarding the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights: (1) Justice Frankfurter's view that the
amendment carries "independent potency;" (2) Justice Black's view that it
totally incorporates the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights against
the States; and (3) Justice Brennan's view that the rights provided by the
Bill of Rights may be selectively incorporated by the Supreme'Court.
A. Adamson v. California
InAdamson v. California,' two major methodologies were introduced
regarding the potency of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurrence, argued that the Due Process clause has an
"independent potency," which is not defined by. the Bill of Rights.87
Frankfurter believed that judicial interpretation should be dynamic in that
it should be capable of adjusting to a maturing sense of society. Frankfurter
concluded that a rigid construction of the Due Process clause would simply
"turn[ ] it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights"
and "would assume that no other abuses would reveal themselves in the
course of time [other] than those which had become manifest in 1791."'
Thus, under his case-by-case approach, Frankfurter would have the court,
when evaluating claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, determine if the
proceedings offended "those canons of decency and fairness which express
'6 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
1s
7 Id. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, in explaining his
conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment has independent potency, notes:
[t]he short answer to the suggestion that the provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which ordains "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," was a way of saying that
every State must thereafter initiate prosecutions through indictment by a
grand jury, must have a trial by a jury of twelve in criminal cases, and must
have trial by such a jury in common law suits where the amount in
controversy exceeds twenty dollars, is that it is a strange way of saying it.
It would be extraordinarily strange for a Constitution to convey such
specific commands in such a roundabout and inexplicit way.
Id. at63.
I Id. at 67.
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the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."' 89 Without such a
violation, Frankfurter would be satisfied that the accords of due process
were offered.
The second proposal put forth in Adamson was that of Justice Black,
who advocated an approach based on total incorporation of the first eight
amendments against State governments. Black argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment and its history are "sufficiently explicit to 'guarantee that
thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and
protections of the Bill of Rights."' 9° Black believed that in accepting an
approach based on the total incorporation of the protections of the Bill of
Rights against the States, the Court could provide a guarantee of objectiv-
ity.' ' Furthermore, he concluded that in doing so, the Court would
absolutely conform to the intent of the framers.'92
B. Selective Incorporation
The third approach, selective incorporation, merges portions of each of
the first two approaches and has been accepted by the Court. Under
selective incorporation, judges may conclude that rights guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights are applicable to the states; however, the approach they take
in doing so offers them a great degree of flexibility.'93 This approach,
which was put forth by Justice Brennan, has been accepted by the Court but
has been severely criticized by its opponents. For example, long-time
Columbia law professor Louis Henkin argued that "[s]elective incorpora-
tion finds no support in the language of the amendment, or in the history of
its adoption.""' Despite such criticism, at least one scholar argues that, to
an extent, Brennan's approach is a means of "achieving total incorporation
189 Id.
'90 Id. at 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
9' See id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Black stated:
I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment--to extend to all the people of the nation the complete
protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold that this Court can determine what,
if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what
degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution.
Id.
192 See id.
'93 Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation " in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74, 76 (1963); Amar, supra note 156, at 1263.
'94 Henkin, supra note 193, at 77.
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by indirection, clause by clause, without having to overrule pre-Warren
Court precedent repudiating Black."' 5
Since the Court adopted selective incorporation, nearly every amend-
ment has been fully incorporated. However, four rights within the first eight
amendments remain unincorporated: the right to keep and bear arms, the
right against quartering soldiers, and the rights to grand and civil juries.
96
The Supreme Court has not considered whether the right to keep and bear
arms should be incorporated against the states.
C. The Second Amendment and Incorporation
The Second Amendment remains one of the few fundamental rights
provided in the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated by the
Supreme Court. The theories of incorporation clearly lend themselves
toward assisting specific sides of the debate surrounding the Second
Amendment. For example, Justice Black's theory of total incorporation
clearly appeals to the individual rights scholars, in that it applies the
Second Amendment as a restraint against the several States.'97 Under this
approach, the Second Amendment, following the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, acts as the guarantor of the individual right to keep
and bear arms against both federal and state governments. Alternately,
adherents to the collective rights approach take a more selective view,
believing that since the Second Amendment has not explicitly been
incorporated by the Supreme Court, the States are not restrained by its
constraints.' 9 However, without action by the Supreme Court, we are left
without a clear answer as to whether the amendment limits state action.
The Supreme Court has not yet evaluated the Second Amendment and
its potency with respect to incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
195 AMAR, supra note 17, at 220.
196 See id.
'9' See Levinson, supra note 11, at 652. William Van Alstyne, in arguing for
incorporation, notes that as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment, "[w]hat was
previously forbidden only to Congress to do was ... equally forbidden to any
state." Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 1253.
198 See Levinson, supra note 11, at 652. This approach has generally been
attacked by individual rights scholars. For example, in his groundbreaking work,
The Embarrassing Second Amendment, Sanford Levinson is highly critical of
jurisprudence concluding that the Second Amendment is not a limitation against
the states. He questions, "[w]hy ... should Cruickshank [sic] and Presser be
regarded as binding precedent any more than any of the other 'pre-incorporation'
decisions refusing to apply given aspects of the Bill of Rights against the states?"
Levinson, supra note 11, at 653.
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It should be noted that two of the most important Supreme Court cases
concerning the Second Amendment, United States v. Cruikshank'99 and
Presser v. Illinois, °° were both decided prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions regarding the status of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
most recent treatment of the Second Amendment occurred in United States
v. Miller,2"' in which the Court upheld a provision of the National Firearms
Act of 1934 that prohibited the transportation of unregistered firearms
through interstate commerce.202 United States v. Miller, however, was
decided prior to Adamson v. California, where Justices Frankfurter and
Black brought the debate over incorporation to the forefront of active
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Miller Court did not attempt to define the
substantive right protected by the Second Amendment.2"3 Thus, in Miller
the Supreme Court neither considered the possibility that the Second
Amendment was incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), overruled by Silveira v.
Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). In Cruikshank, the Supreme Court noted
that the Second Amendment "means no more than that [bearing arms] shall not be
infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than
to restrict the powers of the national government." Id. at 553.
200 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), overruled by Silveira v. Lockyer,
312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). In Presser, the Court cites Cruikshank in
concluding that "the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress
and the National government, and not upon that of the States." Id. at 265.
201 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). In Miller, the Court described
the purpose of the Second Amendment as "assur[ing] the continuation and
render[ing] possible the effectiveness of [the militia]."Id at 178. Further, the Court
concluded that the possession of a sawed-off shotgun lacked a "reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." Id.
Moreover, writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds, concluded the shotgun was
not a "part of the ordinary military equipment" and that "its use could' [not]
contribute to the common defense." Id. (citation omitted)
202 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 n.1 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). InPrintz, Justice Scalia struck down provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Protection Act for violating the Tenth Amendment and its protection of
State sovereignty. Id. at 935. Concurring, Justice Thomas noted "[i]f, however, the
Second Amendment is read to confer a personal right to 'keep and bear arms,' a
colorable argument exists that the Federal Government's regulatory scheme, at least
as it pertains to the purely intrastate sale or possession of firearms, runs afoul of
that Amendment's protections." Id. at 938 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas seemed to advocate a re-examination of the Second Amendment so that the
Court could define the protections which it affords. See id. at 938-39.
203 See id. at 938.
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Amendment, nor did it evaluate the substantive right provided by the
amendment.
D. The Second Amendment and Bill of Rights Jurisprudence
In the last half-century, the Supreme Court established a clear policy
of inaction regarding the Second Amendment. This course has 'aroused
considerable ire among the community of Second Amendment scholars
who follow the Court's jurisprudence. For example, Sanford Levinson has
written, "[t]he Supreme Court has almost shamelessly refused to discuss the
issue."2°4 One likely reason for this anger is that without a definitive
pronouncement by the Supreme Court, the populace cannot be sure of the
rights'provided by the Second Amendment.
As noted earlier, the tradition of the Second Amendment is one of dual
aims: the Amendment conveys an individual right to keep and bear arms,
while promoting the ability of the several States to each maintain an armed
militia. Unlike many of the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights, the Second
Amendment and its militia clause form a causal nexus with the govern-
ments of the several States. The amendment is uniquely affiliated with the
states in that it denies the federal government sufficient authority to
regulate state militias. As a consequence of the unique interplay that the
Second Amendment facilitates between the populace and the States, it may
be appropriate for federal courts to defer to state legislatures and judicial
bodies when confronted with questions regarding the Second Amendment
and the right to keep and bear arms.
It remains unclear to what degree the right to keep and bear arms may
be regulated. When viewed in the context of the wide array of historical
evidence, it is nearly undeniable that the Amendment conveys an individual
right to keep and bear arms. Yet the Supreme Court, in establishing
jurisprudence on a variety of the fundamental rights within the Bill of
Rights, has defined and at times limited those rights.2 °5 Furthermore, the
204 Levinson, supra note 11, at 653-54.
205 For example, the Supreme Court continually refines its approach to First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has consistently found that the First
Amendment's conveyance of a right to free speech is not absolute. See, e.g.,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (holding that the regulation of commercial speech does not violate the First
Amendment's right to free speech if the regulation satisfies a four-part test); FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that indecent speech, although
protected by the First Amendment's right to free speech, was subject to reasonable
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court has established an active policy of inaction regarding Second
Amendment jurisprudence. Perhaps the Court has refused to enter the
debate over the Second Amendment in order to avoid introducing a new
quagmire into its Bill of Rights jurisprudence. By practicing judicial
restraint, the Court has promoted the values of federalism by allowing state
legislatures and state judicial bodies to define the right to keep and bear
arms, further confirming the causal nexus between the several States and
the Second Amendment.
CONCLUSION
It is truly curious that the United States Supreme Court has taken such
a hands-off approach to the Constitution's Second Amendment. While
other amendments to the Bill of Rights are routinely examined, the Second
Amendment was last evaluated before World War II. As originally enacted,
the amendment unmistakably conveys an individual right to bear arms. The
founding fathers, in drafting the amendment, sought to protect citizens from
the potential abuses of an overbearing government. Moreover, they aspired
to foster reform for their militia system in the hope that they might be able
to save it'as a means of national defense. Not only did the founding fathers
convey an individual right, but, as evidenced by the manuscript of William
Manning, the populace viewed the Second Amendment as a device that
confirmed the natural right to keep and bear arms and offered protections
against oppressive government.
Based on its consistently inconsistent performance in the American
Revolution, the founding fathers realized that without sufficient reform the
militia would never successfully resist outside threats. Despite the hopes of
the founding fathers, the militia proved ineffectual and Congress never
enacted meaningful militia reform. The western campaign against the
Native Americans provided a stark contrast between the advantages of a
restricted standing army and the loosely disciplined militia system.
Although Washington's response to the Whiskey Rebellion demonstrated
that the militia clearly had a use in resisting internal dissent, its position as
a means of national defense was still viewed as tenuous at best.
Evidence marshaled regarding the right to keep and bear arms in the
South further demonstrates that it was widely viewed that, in the antebel-
regulation); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscenity is
outside the protections of the First Amendment's right to free speech); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding the government may regulate the
content of speech when such speech constitutes "fighting words").
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lum United States, "the people" had a right to keep and bear arms. In their
desire to maintain the deplorable institution of slavery, southern states used
gun control laws to restrict the ability of free blacks and Native Americans
to keep and bear arms. By disarming their enslaved populations, southern
whites maintained social control throughout their society. Moreover,
following secession, the Confederate States of America, which favored
states' rights, adopted the exact text of the Second Amendment. Since the
right to keep and bear arms was so fundamental to southern society, the
reproduction of the Second Amendment in the Confederate Constitution
serves as evidence that the right to keep and bear arms was seen as a natural
right of fundamental importance that provided an individual right to keep
and bear arms.
The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment altered the framework of
the Constitution. Thereafter, the several States were bound by rights that
previously restricted only the federal government. However, unlike many
of the rights provided in the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment forms
a uniquely causal nexus with the several States. Its dual aims provide an
individual right to keep and bear arms and confirm the importance of the
militia system to the framers. Unlike its approach to many of the rights
conveyed by the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has taken a hands-off
approach to the Second Amendment. By actively choosing to avoid Second
Amendment cases, the Court implicitly promotes the values of federalism.
Judicial restraint in this area has allowed the Court to avoid the constant
definition and shaping of rights that have come to symbolize its recent Bill
of Rights jurisprudence. Furthermore, state legislatures and judicial bodies
remain in the position to engage in deliberative debate over this fundamen-
tal right. Thus, perhaps the approach of the Supreme Court in choosing to
exercise judicial restraint is not one of inaction, but rather one of action.
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